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BOOK REVIEWS
The Logical Foundations o f Bradley's Metaphysics: Judgment, Inference, and 
Truth, by James W. Allard. Cambridge University Press, 2005. Pp. xviii + 
241. $75.00 (cloth).
SAM ADDISON, University of Aberdeen
James W. Allard's book, The Logical Foundations o f Bradley's Metaphysics: 
Judgment, Inference, and Truth, is, in one obvious respect, a straightforward 
historical work. Viewed as such, it provides a significant and worthwhile 
contribution to the study of F. H. Bradley, the often misrepresented but 
nevertheless influential nineteenth-century idealist, and in particular his 
lesser-read work, The Principles o f Logic. In his opening chapter, "Faith, Ide­
alism, and Logic," Allard sketches the social and intellectual conditions 
from which the tensions between the deep-rooted Christianity of Victorian 
Britain and the emerging fields of evolutionary biology and scholarly anal­
ysis of Scripture brought forth the manifestation of idealist philosophy in 
the likes of Green and Lotze, who drew from Kant and Hegel. From here 
Allard demonstrates why Bradley's treatise on logic was a crucial contribu­
tion to the developing idealist philosophy, and then through subsequent 
chapters reconstructs Bradley's conception of logic. What emerges is a clear 
and intricate path from his logic to the well-known metaphysical positions 
of monism and holism found in his more widely read work, Appearance 
and Reality. This aspect of the development of Bradley's philosophy has 
been under-acknowledged, and as well as remedying this Allard's book 
provides a clear and systematic reconstruction and analysis of Bradley's 
notably unclear and unsystematic Principles of Logic.
Viewed merely as such, Allard's book would be essential reading for 
those interested in nineteenth-century British Idealism. And of course it 
is. Yet its readership should be wider than this. For who, it may be won­
dered, takes absolute idealism seriously in anything other than a historical 
sense? To declare oneself as such, to be actively engaged with the sort of 
'speculative' metaphysics that preoccupied the idealists, would be more 
likely to prompt an incredulous stare than any defence of Lewisian modal 
realism, for example. Furthermore, aside from the outmoded metaphysics, 
Russell's well known critique of Bradley's apparently coherence-based ac­
count of truth, in which truth is on the one hand a matter of degree, and on 
the other hand identical with the whole of reality and thus unattainable,
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would seem to set him outside the realm of acceptability in the eyes of 
many philosophers concerned with truth and logic.
Allard notes the unfortunate and inaccurate view of Bradley's philoso­
phy as a "weedy exotic" (p. ix), and sets out to present his views as highly 
sophisticated and relevant. In Allard's reconstruction of Bradley's analysis 
of conditional judgments, he notes that although the "standard textbook 
analysis" (p. 89) of universal judgments such as "All animals are mortal" 
takes it as given that they are devoid of existential import, it was Bradley 
who propagated this view against the traditional Aristotelian understand­
ing. The necessary arguments for what is a given in standard contempo­
rary logics can be found, it seems, in Bradley's Principles o f Logic. Moreover, 
the seed for what has become the contemporary debate over the nature of 
truth, developing through the likes of James, Russell, Quine, Strawson, 
and so forth, were sown there too. As Allard repeatedly suggests in the 
lead up to the final chapter, "Truth," before Bradley, the traditional Aristo­
telian view of truth as correspondence with fact was accepted uncritically, 
as if a truism.
Through his detailed reconstruction of Bradley's views, Allard gives 
enough critique and defence to show how important his work is to any­
one considering an analysis of judgment, inference, and particularly 
truth. Thanks to Russell, Bradley's coherence-based account of truth is 
generally viewed as worthy of some historical interest, but essentially in­
coherent. Yet in Allard's exposition, Bradley's account comes across not 
merely as acceptable but in parts positively persuasive. His discussion 
of Bradley's analysis of singular categorical judgments such as "Caesar 
crossed the Rubicon," for instance, sounds strikingly modern, providing 
clear and substantial reasons for accepting that the truth value of any 
statement such as this is a matter of degree, and never simply true or false 
(pp. 182-191).
In this instance, Allard explains that this judgment is incomplete, since 
it is intended to be about a particular individual. Yet the proper name, 
"Julius Caesar," is only meaningful due to its association with descrip­
tions of the intended individual, such as "the man named 'Julius Caesar.'" 
Descriptions, however, range across possible worlds. So any description 
that lends meaning to the proper name, insofar as it is intended to pick 
out an individual, will fail to do so, since the description can by nature 
apply to different individuals. One can extend the level of description, 
and narrow the range of individuals picked out, but the ideal limit at 
which one and only one individual is picked out by a description cannot 
be reached.
Of course, we can see that there is a difference between asserting that 
the statement "Caesar crossed the Rubicon" is true, and asserting that it 
is false; to assert the latter would be to err. Bradley agrees. It is the notion 
that the difference involves any correspondence between the judgment 
and fact, or lack thereof, and further that the distinction is a bivalent one, 
with which Bradley takes issue. It is not that judgments are not explicit 
enough, but that they never could be. Crucial to Bradley's position is the 
claim that all judgments are abbreviated inferences, a conclusion Allard 
brings us to over chapters 3 to 5. So not only are judgments by their nature 
too general to possess a single truth-value, but their truth is dependent
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upon further conditionals, which can never be made complete. So there 
is no statement which can be made unambiguously true. Judgments thus 
have degrees of truth, but only as compared to other judgments, since the 
ideal limit is infinite and unreachable and hence the degree of truth in a 
judgment cannot be given anything like a percentage value. A judgment 
cannot be made more true simply by making the description more ex­
plicit, or revealing the layers of implicit inference. What instead emerges 
is a holistic system whereby judgments derive their truth-value via com­
parison with other judgments, rather than in and of themselves. Allard 
states Bradley's criterion thus: "One judgment is more true than another if 
it is more completely specified than the other in terms of what the person 
making it knows" (p. 190).
From this, Bradley's monism should be apparent, since for him the only 
complete, unambiguous and therefore wholly true judgment is identical 
with the whole of reality. Yet this does not mean that thought and reality 
are identical for Bradley. The opposite is true, and Allard shows how the 
arguments in The Principles of Logic are intended to construct a system of 
logic that avoid what Bradley saw as the "cheap and easy identification of 
thought and reality" (p. 149).
This emerges in Allard's presentation of Bradley's approach to the 
'problem of inference.' The problem appears as follows: if deductive infer­
ences are valid, they can state no more in the conclusion than they do in 
the premises, and so they are uninformative; if they are informative they 
must state more in the conclusion than they do in the premises, and so 
they are invalid. Chapter 6, "The Problem of Inference," examines Mill's 
expression and approach to the problem, viewing deductive inference as 
subordinate to inductive logic, in comparison to Hegel's solution insofar 
as it requires the identity of thought and reality. Neither, of course, emerge 
as satisfactory, yet it is not until the end of the chapter that Allard brings 
in Bradley, represented as introducing an approach to logic distinct from 
other idealists such as Green and Bosanquet.
It is in the following chapter, "The Validity of Inference," that Allard 
delivers Bradley's positive approach to the problem, building upon his ac­
count of judgment, developed in earlier chapters. Through this it emerges 
that the notion that, "If an inference is legitimate, then its conclusion is 
asserted in its premises," is rejected by Bradley (p. 165). In the case of the 
familiar syllogism regarding all men, Socrates, and mortality, the premise 
that "All men are mortal" is given the familiar modern interpretation as a 
universal conditional. Its content does not derive from any existing men, 
of which Socrates is one. Since Socrates is a man, the term "man" acts as 
a unifier, revealing "a new quality of Socrates" (p. 164) and yielding the 
conclusion through synthesis of ideal contents rather than mere re-state­
ment of what is already implicitly known.
Of course, while inferences can be informative and valid in this sense 
for Bradley, there is a further sense in which he denies their validity. The 
process of inference has no counterpart in reality, so there is no correspon­
dence between judgment and reality, since all judgments are abbreviated 
inferences. Because inferences all have ideal contents and are incomplete, 
they are not identical to reality, since reality is concrete, complete, and 
wholly real.
216 Faith and Philosophy
It may not be the case that many will be persuaded, by Bradley's argu­
ments, into accepting the notion that truth has degrees, and that the only 
genuine individual is the whole of reality. There remains, by the end, a 
lingering suspicion that Russell's accusations of incoherence may not have 
been as far off as Allard seems to suggest. But to swell the ranks of abso­
lute idealists is not Allard's goal. What the book does achieve is to present 
Bradley's metaphysics as far from abstruse, fanciful, meaningless, and eas­
ily dismissed, but one rigorously grounded in a theory of logic. Avoiding 
his holism and monism cannot be satisfactorily achieved by simply ignor­
ing Bradley, but rather by engaging with his solutions to the problems in 
the philosophy of logic and, to an extent, the philosophy of language. It 
hardly needs to be stated that the natures of inference, judgment, and truth 
are of central concern to modern philosophy. Re-engaging with Bradley in 
the way that Allard does in this book not only affirms his position as one 
of significant influence, but also provides insights and challenges still rel­
evant and important for metaphysics and the theory of logic.
Evidence and Faith: Philosophy and Religion Since the Seventeenth Century, by 
Charles Taliaferro. Cambridge University Press, 2005. xi + 457 pp. $75.00 
(cloth), $29.99 (paper).
JAMES E. TAYLOR, Westmont College
This book is a volume in the Cambridge University Press series entitled 
"The Evolution of Modern Philosophy," edited by Paul Guyer and Gary 
Hatfield. Each volume of this series examines the historical development of 
a current subdiscipline of philosophy from the standpoint of a contempo­
rary practitioner. In this case, the subdiscipline is the philosophy of religion 
and the practitioner is Charles Taliaferro, whom readers of this journal will 
recognize as a philosopher eminently qualified to produce a work of this 
sort. Taliaferro has combined his wealth of knowledge about the history of 
modern and contemporary philosophy with his expertise as a careful and 
creative philosopher to produce an excellent contribution to this series.
In the introduction Taliaferro articulates four main features of the phi­
losophy of religion: it raises fundamental questions about human exis­
tence and the nature of reality, draws on almost every area of philosophy, 
is relevant to practical human concerns, and contains important issues ad­
dressed by most modern philosophers. Throughout the book, he provides 
numerous examples of each of these aspects of philosophical thinking 
about religion.
Though the book is encyclopedic in scope, Taliaferro attempts to pro­
vide it with an organizational unity by treating the concept of evidence, 
broadly conceived and systematically characterized, as a reference point. 
This and related concepts, together with philosophical argumentation 
about religious issues, is the primary focus of the book, though Taliaferro 
does include accounts of historical events, especially at the beginning of 
most chapters, for some contextualization of the philosophical movements,
